studies) and at flows of communications between them (international communication).
International communication, like the field of communication itself, has largely been a product of the U.S. higher education system in the 20th century. From World War II on, however, the vast expansion of the reach and impact of that system exposed the ideas it produced to profound questioning and criticism from other societies around the world (Wallerstein, 1996) . Important work by largely Western European sociologists enriches and in some cases underlies international communication theory, but it is one of the important markers of the turn of the 21st century that theory has itself become internationalized. Increasingly, major works in the field are being written by scholars outside the United States, such as recent works on public opinion by Shamir and Shamir (2000) from Israel and by Splichal (1999) from Slovenia. Although in the past work that drew together theories from the United States and Europe with those from elsewhere often cast one perspective within the context of a second, as when Mowlana and Wilson (1990) examined development communication within the context of Islamic philosophy and practice, in the future the most important work will be based on genuine theoretical syntheses of ideas from around the world of the type modeled by Lult ' (2000) and Mattelart (1994) .
Theories from outside international communication should also be useful. Melucci (1996) , for example, provides an alternative approach to understanding political communication across cultures with his emphasis on identity issues as the crux of contemporary social movements. Theories of turbulence and chaos in international relations (Rosenau, 1990) should provide some relief for those seeking to find generalizations in what may well be ephemeral, and perhaps random, conditions. Network economists (Antonelli, 1992) argue for the use of new units of analy- INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION sis, such as long-term projects carried out by multiply interdependent entities, as most valid and useful in today's environment. Ethnic and family ties have been identified as structural forces in their own right as manifested in international trade and other types of international information flows (Iyer & Shapiro, 1999) . Non-state actors, such as regions (Blanco & van den Bukk, 1995) , transnational corporations (Dezalay & Garth, 1996) , and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (Waterman, 1990) , replace or complement the nation-state as site, subject, and agent in global communication studies. Increasingly, statelike communities are defined virtually rather than geographically (Arquila & Ronfeldt, 1996; Gopnik, 1996) .
Such "cascading" interdependence (Rosenau, 1984) demands that those studying global communication move beyond dependency theory. Constructivism (Adler, 1997) provides one means of doing so, focusing on the impact of today's global information infrastructure on all aspects of international relations (Singh & Rosenau, 2001) . Other work that starts from the position that borders between nation-states today are often not bright lines but rather zones that may be populated by millions of people with well-developed and unique cultures of their own is beginning to appear (Lull, 1997) . Within such zones, individual identity is no longer a question of citizenship but rather of ethnicity and/or hybridity (Mouffe, 1992) .
The nation-state as the unit of analysis also provided a logic and justification for comparative studies. Media systems have been compared along several dimensions, including ownership patterns, organizational structures, regulatory systems, content trends, and reception. The example of comparisons of normative press-state relations-the ways in which a media system and a government interact with mutual effect-demonstrates the limits of such comparative work. The Cold War-era typology known as the "four theories of the press" (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956 ) distinguishes among types of media systems according to where they lie on a spectrum from complete government control (totalitarian or communist) to democratic, with the notion of a press that operates in terms of "social responsibility" lying in between. This model reeks of its geopolitical origins (Simpson, 1994) ; for decades now-even in North America, and even before the dissolution of the Soviet Union-although the theory has been taught, in many cases this was done with the caveat that the theory doesn't actually apply to the contemporary situation. A wide-ranging critique of this approach appeared in Last Rights (Nerone, 1995) . The task today, however, is to come up with analternative typology of media systems that is comprehensive and complex enough to be able to cope with the great variety of media systems currently in existence and emerging. Chan (1997) offers one such alternative typology based on his analyses of media systems in Asian countries.
A further concomitant of the focus on the nation-state is that each is a place between which communications flow. International communication theory historically has done a good job of looking at the nature and impact of communications flows on lar~e populations, examining both mass media content as it affects society and political communications as it affects nation-states. Conceptualization of these flows has become more complex and has come to encompass not only flows of content but also those of infrastructure, audiences, genres, and knowledge structures (Appadurai, 1990; Braman, Shah, & Fair, 2000) .
Those studying international communi_cation have focused exclusively on flows between humans. In the future, however, there will be an increasing need to take into account communications between humans 111 and computers-distinguishing between communication with databases, programs, intelligent agents, and avatars-as well as those communications between computers that never involve humans at all. Not only do these other types of flows comprise an everlarger proportion of global information flows (Tele-Geography, 2000) , but they are also increasingly sig11ificant as structural forces for human society (Lessig, 1999) . Indeed, the argument has been made that the nation-state itself might be best understood as an information processor (Richards, 1993) .
THE FACT
The narrative forms of modernity were defined by their relationship to the fact, what is known as "facti city." Fiction, for example, defines itself as not being fact, whereas journalists, on the other hand, claim the news they present is. Issues raised by facticity are important to ·the study of global communication today in a number of ways.
The unbundling of different types of information resources, the ways in which value is added to them, and the means by which property rights can be asserted over them have been among the most notable features of the information economy that had appeared by the close· of the 20th century. This was just the point of the debate over the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), which concerned the right and ability of developing nations to control flows of information about themselves, whether via journalism or satellite surveillance. The question of ownership and control over facts is · · -also at the heart of data privacy issues, first addressed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the 1970s. Already at that point Europe and the United States were diverging in the degrees to which they protected the privacy of individuals about whom data had been gathered for commercial, administrative, and other purposes with significant impacts on international trade. And as the two types of informational meta-technologiesbiotechnology and digital information technology-themselves converge, political and legal struggles over each have implications that apply to the other. W~>rk has begun on the ways in which this will shape the context and content of global communication (Braman, 2001) .
There are three ways in which debates over how a fact is determined in the first place appeared as issues with which international communication theorists had to deal. First, debates over the relative accuracy of the procedures used by "objective" and "new" journalism parallel those over the procedures of social science: "Objective" New York Times-style journalists attempt to mimic the natural sciences in the collection and presentation of narrowly defined, or "thin," facts derived exclusively from official institutional sources presented in data form without contextualization, and what became known as "new" journalists in the 1960s seek to provide richer, or "thick," facts derived from a wider variety of types of sources presented in narrative form contextualized as fully as possible. Journalists working from the two different perspectives on the same story can produce radically different versions of reality, with deep significance for the quality and effects of reportage on political and cultural affairs in the international environment (Braman, 1985) . Second, claims of the kind of dependency asserted by those calling for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) have been challenged on factual grounds also having to do with the nature of the procedures by which facts are produced (Cioffi-Revilla & Merritt, 1982) . And third, it appears that fact and fiction are translated and received in different ways (Biltereyst, 1992 ; , 1992) . Whereas the first two issues mentioned here deal with differences in how facticity is produced, the sets of questions pursued by this last group of researchers concern the reception of facticity.
Although modernity was characterized by optimism regarding the possibility of coming to know the "facts" of social life, another characteristic of postmodernity is that this confidence is waning or lost. One factor contributing to this loss of confidence is yet another consequence of the state-centrism of social theory: Beck (1992) has powerfully argued that societies are failing to track much environmental damage and the causal chains leading to it because it is beyond the geographic and time horizons of the state's statistical perceptual mechanisms. Although international agreements that push toward ever greater "transparency" (Fiorini, 2000) across geopolitical boundaries yield the perception that there is greater knowledge, international communication theory and research in the future will also need to acknowledge and deal with situations in which it is difficult to determine the facts at all.
THE UNIVERSAL
The epistemological ground of modernity was found in the universal, the notion that there are eternal laws discoverable by science. As applied to the social sciences, this universalism led to an assumption that the social structures being studied were stable or, if changing, developed only in linear, predictable, and inevitable ways. Today, however, social conditions are undergoing rapid and seemingly constant change. Thus, theory and research must deal with the ways in which social structures come about and are transformed. Downing (1996) has drawn our attention to the difference between the two approaches as played out in international communication; he found that the assumption of stability in communications systems in the theories he had used for decades in research around the world severely limited the utility of those ideas for understanding the societies of the former Soviet Union in the 1990s. The emergence of the postmodern condition has implications for the study of international communication because it draws attention to the role of communications in the transformation of societies, affects how the relationships between communications and society are understood from a systems perspective, and raises into visibility "the local" in the context of "the global."
The oldest strand of work in international communication that dealt with social change is in the area ofdevelopment communication, or planned social change. Beginning in the 1950s, early approaches assumed a singular and one-way progression from an agricultural to an industrial society, from the premodern to the modern, and from the nondemocratic to the democrati~. Most of this work also assumed that development would be exogenously driven-that is, that a society farther along the development path would facilitate change in those societies "running behind." More recent work, however, has suggested there may be a multiplicity of ways in which societies may choose or find themselves adapting to changing global conditions in ways satisfying and appropriate to their own cultures and values (Servaes, 1986) . Increasingly, it is acknowledged that this may be done most successfully when development is endogenously driven-that is, when members of a society determine their own directions for change in what is called "participatory development" (White, Nair, & Ascroft, 1994 ) . And a far more complex picture is being given of the ways in which interactions among societies at different stages of development and following different types of development paths influence each other, including what is being 113 learned by the most "developed" societies from those historically perceived as underdeveloped (Braman, 2001) . The past couple of decades have also seen increasing attention to the study of the role of communications in societies undergoing unplanned change driven by geopolitical shifts, such as in the former Soviet Union, eastern and central Europe Oakubowicz, 1990) and Hong Kong (Chan & Lee, 1991) .
Although these different ways of understanding the role of communications in planned and unplanned social change have rarely been cast in terms of systems theory, they are ripe for doing so. Systems theory, or cybernetics, was one of the intellectual products of World War II, and in its first decades of development-coincident with the first decades of development communication workfocused on stable systems structures for which change was problematic and examined single systems in isolation. Only two thinkers took a systems approach to development during this period (Mewes, 1971; Myrdal, 1956) , and neither had much impact on thinking or practice in international communication. More recently, systems theory, now referred to as second-order cybernetics or complex adaptive systems theory, has come to take a more complex view of systems as healthy when undergoin.g often necessary transformations, and as always operating within a larger universe of multiply interacting systems at the same, infra-, and supralevels. Krippendorff (1987) has begun the work of applying second-order cybernetics to the study of the role of communications in societies undergoing planned and unplanned change, but a great deal of both theory and research needs to be done in this area.
Views of globalization that focus on singular causality, homogenization of effect, and the need to focus on the general rather than the particular (Featherstone, 1990) are another way in which modern interest in the universal has been expressed in international communication. Today, however, many argue that both causality (Abbate, 1999) and the effects of globalization are multiple, diverse, and differ from place to place (Enzensberger, 1992) . The most important direction in which this thinking has led has been in the study of the local and particular in contrast to the universal and the global (Borgmann, 1999; Entrikin, 1991) . Indeed, a new sense of the local as the global emerged in the 1960s (Ang, 1998) . The global and the local are understood to compete with each other in the orientation of production (Thorbecke, 1992) , appeals for markets (Cunningham & Jacka, 1996) , content provision (Boyd-Barrett, 1998), and definition of class (Parameswaran, 1997; Wallerstein, 1990) . Taxation (Goolsbee, 2000) and control over intellectual property rights (Sell, 1995} are among the techniques by which nation-states seek to pursue their individual objectives within an increasingly globalized environment. Struggles over memory and archival systems are particularly important arenas in which success of the global and general can cause destruction of the local and particular (Greaves, 1994) . Meyrowitz (1994) uses the term saturation to describe such a situation, but Hannerz (1997) argues in response that in today's environment there is gradually unfolding maturation of multiply layered understandings as global culture is mediated via the different frames of the market, the nationstate, everyday life, and social movements. Meanwhile, the global is made local through consumption (Maxwell, 1996) , infrastructure (Star & Ruhleder, 1996) , and the design of specific artifacts (Tice, 1995) .
Both spatial and symbolic approaches have been used to locate the site of the local. Among spatial approaches, a number of scholars look to the body (Featherstone, Hepworth, & Turner, 1991) , whereas others argue that the body itself is now so infected with the machine INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION -whether mechanical or computationalthat it is best referred to as "cyborg," itself a challenge to the nation-state because it is deterritorialized (Beller, 1996) . The home is now studied as a site in which the global and the local meet (Silverstone & Hirsch, 1992), in part because media use in the home is a means of leaving. Cities have gained in importance in the study of global communication, culture, and information: The notion of a "world city" appeared as early as the beginning of the 1980s (Abu-Lughod, 1992), and approaches to study of the city now include those that look at urban centers as command and control sites for the intermeshing of global financial, production, and distribution systems (Sassen, 1991) ; as economic engines because they are dense in information resources (Lash & Urry, 1993) ; as serving global functions because of their cultural creativity (Amin, 1997); as edges, or links between nodes, rather than nodes themselves (Garreau, 1992) ; and as symbolic sites altogether Gasen-Verbeke, 1998).
The most influential approach to symbolic constructions of the local was launched by Anderson's (1983) analysis of the nation-state as an "imagined community." The local is seen as the site of specific knowledge or information, and therefore of power (Geertz, 1983) . Place as a site of information and as discourse appears in usages such as the notion of a "European information area" that has replaced "European audiovisual space" in European policy discourse (Schlesinger, 1997) . Individual identity is also seen as a site in which globalization forces are expressed today. As Elkins (1997) notes, in today's environment each individual is in effect a community of the communities in which each voluntarily chooses to participate. Hybridity-uma cultura mulata in Brazil (Canevacci, 1992) -is a new type of identity formation characterized by a greater degree of openness and acceptance of internal splits. Bhabha (1993) argues that hybrid identities are a form of political resistance, a notion supported by Sakamoto (1996) when he describes its first appearance in Japan during the Meiji Restoration of the mid-19th century at a time when that government deliberately took up study of the West as a means of protecting Japanese culture. Nardi and O'Day (2000) suggest that the intersection between global and local knowledge be viewed as the information ecology unique to each person. The growth of indigenous voices and media in global communication has further strengthened appreciation of the local as symbolically defined (e.g., Ginsburg, 1994 ) .
''Authenticity" tells you whether or not you're "there" (Ning, 1999) , whether you go to it, as in tourism (Chang & Holt, 1991) , or bring it to you in the home or the museum (Errington, 1994) . Multiple typologies of authenticity distinguish among sources of the perception of authenticity-whether it is authenticity of the self, experience, other persons, or objects-as well as among degrees of simulation versus verisimilitude (Wang, 1999) . As Clifford (1997) notes, every appropriation of culture, including the sense of authenticity, reveals a specific historical narration that can vary from those of accumulation and preservation to those of redistribution and decay.
Although movement in and of itself was a characteristic of modernity important to understanding communication (Bachmair, 1991) , the local has now become detached from physical space as a result of the movement of populations who carry with them a symbolic space but leave behind the geographic and of the ubiquitous diffusion of the information infrastructure. Over the past 30 years, migration has emerged as a major social force as the numbers of people in movement have vastly grown and their composition has shifted (Castles, 1998) . Even directionality has changed: In Europe, countries that for centuries had been sending out migrants are now receiving them, and even Japan is opening itself to migrants from poorer countries in Asia and South America to satisfy its labor needs. As a result, most of the world's developed countries are now diverse, multiethnic societies (Massey, et al., 1993) . Traditional types of migrant press continue to thrive, sometimes serving migrant populations with new demographics such as those of the Hong Kong "yacht immigrants" in Canada (So & Lee, 1995) . Migrant populations produce content of their own as well; Austrian artist Ingo Gunther conceives of this population as the citizenry of a nation-state of its own. Ultimately, the local today is an effect of "viscosity" (Hookway, 1999) , what Amin (1997) describes as sites of fixities of tradition and continuity within a globalized environment of transformation. Hookway (1999) describes individual uses of the global information infrastructure today as producing "predatory locales." These interactions and transactions are local because they always occur at a specific time and place, but are predatory because each now triggers actions within global human and nonhuman systems. Because such predatory locales are ubiquitous globally, and because the interactions they trigger are carried out by the nonhuman agents of software, Hookway describes today's environment as pandemonic. One is "acquired" by becoming visible to a system, whether of marketing or other surveillance interests. The predatory locale can emerge via mass media experiences as well as individual transactions: Canevacci (1992) details the ways in which the Brazilian telenovela has abandoned traditional audience research in favor of using what he describes as an "anthropology" of visual communication in which the telenovela "emits" a participant observer from its flexible production center in response to every changing nuance of the environment. This can have a powerful effect, as when telenovelas used speech from the barrios when those voices were silenced, thus educating the middle class and serving as a force for democracy.
POWER
Much of the study of international communication is about power-either how to exercise it or complaining about its exercise by others. Throughout the period of modernity, however, conceptualizations of power grew more complex and power itself came to be understood as multiple. One of the characteristics of postmodernity is that a new form of power has come to be dominant both in itself and as it has affected the exercise of other forms of power long available. Political scientists and communication scholars · studying the conditions of modernity explored instrumental power (control over the material world), structural power (control over rules and institutions), and symbolic power (control over ideas); postmodern attention has turned in addition to the study of genetic power (control over the informational bases of materials, rules and institutions, and ideas). Too, historically the distinction between power in its actual state (as exercised) and its potential state (power allegedly available for use) has been important; today power in its virtual state (forms of power that do not yet exist but that can be brought into being using extant knowledge and skills) is now increasingly important. Because information and information technologies are critical to power in its genetic form and in its virtual state, these shifts in the nature of power and the ways in which it is conceptualized are fundamental to the study of global information, communication, and culture . (Braman, 1995) .
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION
The earliest form of power to be recognized as such was clearly instrumental power; power is generally equated with physical control over a territory and its population. War is perhaps the ultimate in the actual exercise of instrumental power. The impact of new information technologies on the tools and practices of war has stimulated a reconsideration of the role of such technologies throughout history in weaponry (Dandeker, 1990; de Landa, 1991; Macksey, 1989) and in the command and control systems that determine how weapons will be used (Dandeker, 1990; Dudley, 1991; Keegan, 1987) . Both have grown more sophisticated; weapons today are increasingly "smart" and the U.S. military, taking advantage of developments in biotechnology, is currently pursuing co-design of weapons and the humans who will use them. These developments both illustrate the intertwining of various forms of power and identify a research agenda for those working to build international communication theory in the future and to operationalize that theory in practice. Historically not a topic for those in communications, weapons and their support systems today are critical participants in the production and flows of information globally.
The history of modernity is one of the evergreater articulation of structural forms of power via the elaboration of legal and regulatory systems and of the bureaucracies that enact them-the power to decide how things are done. Structural power has been the subject of those in international communication largely through critiques of the effects of flows, as in explorations of dependency caused by media, or cultural, imperialism (Schiller, 1991) . From this perspective, the entire debate about NWICO should be understood as an examination of and struggle over the structural effects of the global communication system, as are analyses of the political effect of international communication flows such as those of the telephone (CioffiRevilla, Merritt, & Zinnes, 1987) . Studies of the geopolitical effects of the building of the global information infrastructure, such as Headrick's (1990) history of the telegraph and telephone systems from the middle of the 19th to the middle of the 20th centuries, highlight the role of communications systems in producing and reproducing structural power. Diplomacy is the communications hinge between structural and symbolic power: Diplomatic communication takes place within a rigidly defined and formal system of roles and rules established early in the 19th century as· a means by which nation-states officially communicate with each other (Korzenny & TingToomey, 1990; van Dinh, 1987) . The inter-. dependence of today's global system discussed above and the increasingly important roles of non-state-and therefore non-diplomaticpolitical communications, whether via terrorism, NGOs, or other routes, provide theoretical and research challenges that are new.
Symbolic power has been an important topic in international communication research that has examined propaganda (Taylor, 1995) and the role of the press in geopolitical relations (classically explored by Cohen, 1963) as well as rhetoric in formal political speech (Hinds & Windt, 1991) . The role of international communication in the exercise of symbolic power is not always publicly evident; Schlesinger and Kinzer (1982) , for example, provide a detailed history of the way in which the use of public relations behind the scenes in Central America shaped political developments there in ways that served U.S.-based interests. Anderson (1983) and Calhoun (1991) elaborate on the relations between structural ·and symbolic power and their geopolitical effect.
The study of the role of international communication in the exercise of genetic power has just begun. De Landa (1991) is moving in 117, this direction when he notes that intelligence agencies have moved away from pure information collection toward the use of simulacra as a means of substituting for actual information. Foucault's notion of governmentality as extending to relations within the self, what he refers to as the microphysics of power, is also a precursor of this notion (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991) , as is Nye's (1990) notion of "soft" power, Rabinow's (1992) concept of "bio" power, and Strange's (1996) explorations of the ways in which power is diffused today. Several ways of thinking about the impact of informationally based genetic power in international relations are introduced by the authors in the Singh and Rosenau (in press) collection. Deleuze and Guattad (1997) and Virilio (Der Derian, 1998) push the metaphoric bounds of such arguments theoretically. The level of analytic detail achieved by Lessig (1999) in his analysis of the informational bases of control within the U.S. system, however, has not yet been seen for the international arena. This is a critically important area for future work in the study of global communication, information, and culture.
Though historically power in its virtual state was trivial compared with its importance in its actual and potential states because the pace of innovation was so slow, the use of new informati. on technologies has reversed this relationship. The U.S. defense establishment maximizes the utility of the virtual in its current approach to information gathering. Rather than identifying specific subjects of surveillance interest and arraying them about a sensor, ·today the National Security Agency takes as its model of information-gathering the panspectron. Multiple sensors are arrayed around all bodies so that information is gathered about everyone, all the time, launching analysis of specific information when triggered by a particular question (De Landa, 1991) . This, too, exacerbates the pandemonic nature of the environment.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION IN A PANDEMONIC ENVIRONMENT
In the end, developments in each of these areas complement, exacerbate, and extend those in the others. The institutions by which facticity has been determined have essentially been those certified by the nation-state, for whom the insistence on the universal and appearance of stability have been useful tools for the assertion of power by individual states. Theory about and research into the details of international communication have historically accepted these terms and focused on the modern questions they framed about the nature of flows of information, communication, and culture around the globe.
In the postmodern condition, however, facticity has come to be understood as culturally rich in addition to being empirically grounded, and thus determined by social interactions in organizational and communal forms beyond those of the nation-state. Such forms-those of the family, ethnicity, community, NGOs, and transnational and multinational corporations-compete and work with the nation-state not only in determination of facticity but in the exercise of other forms of power. The dominant forms of power in the contemporary environment are those that deal with the informational bases of materials, rules and institutions, and ideas-that is, with identity. The local, the site in which identity is grounded, has itself become mobile.
With this, international communication theory and r esearch retu rn to wher e they started, in Jeremy Bentham's almost simultaneous coinage of the words panopticon and international. The panopticon, like the pan-INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION orama of the same era, offered the sense of omniscience that was critical to modern exercises of power. In the panopticon, exemplified by modern prisons, the observer rotates in order to see all, whereas in the panorama, predecessor to film, the observer remains still and that which is being observed moves past the line of vision. In both cases, power is exercised by an observer at the center of a system in which those being surveilled are arrayed about, specifically selected, and arranged for observation.
Under the postmodern conditions of the panspectron, within a pandemonic environment, a new definition of information has emerged. As recently as a decade ago, the range of definitions of information in use fell into a typology in which they were distinguished from each other by the breadth and complexity of the social structure to which the definition was intended to refer and to the amount of power granted information in itself; the typology included information as a resource, as a commodity, as perception of pattern (or as knowledge structures), and as a constitutive force in society (Braman, 1989 (Braman, / 1996 . In the pandemonic environment, mformation is also an agent.
International communication theory in the past has dealt with the problems raised by modernity-how communications systems interact with nation-states; effects of flows · of information, communication, and culture between them; and what happens to the fact. It has begun to deal with the transformations that have brought about the postmodern conditions of the information society, primarily in the analysis of globalization and, now, the local. Analyses of hybrid identities, border communities, and mobile or virtual populations are important explorations of the impact of global communication not interpretable within a solely state-centric frame. A number of specific areas in which theoretical and conceptual development are needed to under-stand contemporary communications processes and their effects have been identified throughout this chapter. Premier among them may be the need to understand the impact of information flows when information is not a conduit of agency but the agent itself.
